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I. Introduction
You have probably seen the meme, or a variation of it: federal
agents are watching you through the camera on your computer or
your phone.1 One need not look further than around a classroom or
workplace: sticky notes and pieces of tape cover the cameras of
many electronic devices. While it is unknown to what extent the
federal government is spying on American citizens through their
computer webcams,2 it may surprise many to know that the United
States government is not the only sovereign power that may be

† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Articles Editor, North
Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 Kathryn Watson, The ‘FBI Agent Watching Me’ Meme is About Accepting Mass
Surveillance, THE DAILY DOT (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/fbiagent-watching-me-meme/
[https://perma.cc/V4X8-ZXGR].
2 See Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About How the FBI Hacks People, WIRED
(May 15, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/history-fbis-hacking/
[https://perma.cc/R4LP-L3KS] (explaining that it is not currently publicly known what
information the FBI or other federal agencies gather through other electronic surveillance,
although previous cases indicate some changes over time in the information gathered).
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snooping around in the personal data of American citizens.3 The
charter of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) does not permit
the organization to conduct intelligence operations on the domestic
activities of United States citizens,4 and the National Security
Agency (“NSA”) is barred by law from carrying out certain types
of spying on American citizens.5 Nations such as the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, however, each
have different surveillance laws that at times make it easier for those
nations to legally spy on American citizens.6 These differing laws
provide an “incentive” for each nation’s intelligence agencies to be
complicit with foreign governments spying on their own citizens.7
This seemingly innocuous truism provides the backdrop for the
amorphous intelligence collective known as “Five Eyes,” formed by
the UKUSA Agreement (“the Agreement”).8 Each of the respective
nations included within the Agreement have their own anti-

3 See Joe Carter, What You Should Know About the “Five Eyes” Intelligence
Community, PROVIDENCE (May 19, 2017), https://providencemag.com/2017/05/knowfive-eyes-intelligence-community/
[https://perma.cc/X6FT-DT3Z] (stating that the original UKUSA Agreement developed
the understanding that respective governments would not spy on each other’s citizens
without permission, although a 2005 NSA directive indicates that the partners “reserve the
right to conduct intelligence operations against each other’s citizens when it is in the best
interest of each nation.”).
4 See Adam Janos, Nixon and Johnson Pushed the CIA to Spy on U.S. Citizens,
Declassified
Documents
Show,
HISTORY
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.history.com/news/cia-surveillance-operation-chaos-60s-protest
[https://perma.cc/V3C3-HJR3] (stating that the Agency’s charter, drafted when the
agency was created in 1947, mandated that “the CIA focus its counterintelligence on
overseas targets only,” reflecting the “Constitutional principle that American citizens are
entitled to a high degree of personal privacy.”).
5 Conor Friedersdorf, Is ‘The Five Eyes Alliance’ Conspiring to Spy on You?, THE
ATLANTIC (June 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/is-thefive-eyes-alliance-conspiring-to-spy-on-you/277190/ [https://perma.cc/44GQ-DF9L].
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Scarlet Kim, Newly Disclosed NSA Documents Shed Further Light on Five Eyes
Alliance, LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/newly-disclosed-nsadocuments-shed-further-light-five-eyes-alliance [https://perma.cc/4M89-A57H] (stating
that a 1985 declassified document notes that the nature and scope of the UKUSA
Agreement extends to third parties as well, with “special consideration . . . given to
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and to not consider them as third parties. This special
consideration is documented in Appendix J of the 1955 version of the agreement and gives
rise to what we now know as the Five Eyes Alliance.”).
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domestic surveillance laws.9 It is alleged that each party to the
Agreement spies on other parties’ citizens and the intelligence
gleaned therein is shared amongst at least the collective.10 Five Eyes
is a multilateral, intelligence sharing, secret-treaty that was
originally formed in 1946 by the United States and the United
Kingdom.11 The current five respective “eyes” include the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.12
Additional nations have also had access to respective programs
within the Five Eyes network, and there is talk of greater
expansion.13
The United States’ national security apparatus is becoming
increasingly interconnected with the national security apparatuses
of the broader global community.14 Nearly all of the information
available on Five Eyes was intended to be classified, but many
documents were made public through a series of legal fights and
massive whistleblowing.15 Most Americans have undoubtedly seen
or read the pervasive, ongoing hand-wringing over the broad scope
of the almost two decade old “Patriot Act,”16 but Five Eyes has
largely stayed out of the public consciousness.17 With the continued
rollback of civil liberties across the board by the current

9 See Friedersdorf, supra note 5 (stating “Allied countries have different laws and
surveillance rules.”).
10 See id.
11 J. Vitor Tossini, The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere, UK
DEFENCE JOURNAL (Nov. 14, 2017), https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-theintelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/ [https://perma.cc/52Q7-9RJF].
12 Id.
13 Noah Barkin, Exclusive: Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance Builds Coalition to
Counter China, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinafiveeyes/exclusive-five-eyes-intelligence-alliance-builds-coalition-to-counter-chinaidUSKCN1MM0GH [https://perma.cc/EDW2-DM6E].
14 See id.
15 Richard Norton-Taylor, Not So Secret: Deal at the Heart of UK-US Intelligence,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-released
[https://perma.cc/8EQJ-G4ZE].
16 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115
Stat. 272, 272 (stating that the goal of the act was to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and
for other purposes”).
17 See Friedersdorf, supra note 5.
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administration,18 the growth of Five Eyes represents a potential
existential threat to the health and wellbeing of the United States.
In essence, to roughly translate the famed Roman satirist Juvenal,
“Who watches the Watchmen?”19 The incredibly broad swath of
data collection20 ensures the proverbial Watchmen will be aware of
you, but who is there to keep them reined in?
Analysis proceeds in six parts. Part I summarizes the history
and background of Five Eyes, considering the original need for and
contributions the intelligence treaty offered to the broader global
community. Part II discusses the history of the Agreement. Part III
traces the evolution of the respective parties’ intelligence gathering
over time. Part IV centers on the legality of the Agreement within
the United States’ statutory and constitutional law. Part V examines
potential hurdles to reform, and considers several different methods
by which the Agreement could be eliminated or at least partially
modified and reined in. Part VI concludes the piece by looking into
the future and determining the most probable policy outcome.
II. Background
One of the greatest intelligence failures in American history
came to a head on the morning of December 7, 1941, when Imperial
Japan bombed the majority of the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at
Pearl Harbor.21 The casualty numbers on their own are astounding
– over 3,500 American soldiers were killed, wounded, or reported
missing in action – not to mention the hundreds of fighter planes
destroyed on the ground, and the damage to and destruction of at
least 17 ships.22 Despite the widespread shock amongst the
18 See generally Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights Rollbacks, THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 2019),
https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks/ [https://perma.cc/UM5L-HSPZ] (listing the
constraint of civil liberties during the Trump administration).
19 JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, 268 (Susanna Morton Braund ed., Harvard Univ. Press
2014).
20 See Kim, supra note 8 (stating that declassified documents “confirms our
understanding of the broad scope of the UKUSA Agreement.”).
21 Pearl Harbor: An Intelligence Failure That Lives in Infamy, STRATFOR (Dec. 7,
2016),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pearl-harbor-intelligence-failure-livesinfamy [https://perma.cc/2GL9-VHKK] [hereinafter STRATFOR].
22 Overview of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 7 December 1941, NAVAL HISTORY &
HERITAGE COMMAND (Dec. 1991), https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/warsconflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1941/pearl-harbor.html [https://perma.cc/3FZUDMRA].
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American public at the time, a sizeable amount of intelligence
existed that indicated an imminent attack at Pearl Harbor and across
the broader Pacific.23 The Empire of Japan was in the midst of war
with China and was engaged in long-standing negotiations with the
United States “to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia.”24 After
the negotiations broke down, U.S. intelligence intercepted
communications indicating that Tokyo did not see a future for its
diplomatic relations with the United States.25
American
communications specialists cracked the codes Japan was using for
diplomatic missives and could read the messages Tokyo sent to its
various embassies, including instructions sent just ahead of the
attack for diplomatic posts to destroy all sensitive materials.26 Yet
when the Imperial Japanese Navy struck Pearl Harbor, the U.S.
Pacific Fleet was sitting unaware and vulnerable in port.27 The
United States knew of Japan’s preparations for hostilities, but it
came up short in understanding Tokyo’s thinking and anticipating
its strategy.28
That said, “[c]ompared with the elaborate infrastructure that the
United States boasts today, the country’s intelligence apparatus was
inchoate in the early 1940s.”29 Instead, the intelligence capabilities
of the United States “did not begin to develop in earnest until after
World War II concluded.”30 During the war, the United States and
the United Kingdom informally shared intelligence regarding their
Axis enemies, but after the conclusion of the War, neither country
thought it wise to cease strategic intelligence sharing,31 as the Nazi
threat had been replaced by the Soviet threat.32 This agreement was
STRATFOR, supra note 21.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 STRATFOR, supra note 21.
30 Id.
31 Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes–Explainer, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer
[https://perma.cc/JCZ6-RBL8].
32 See Vladimir Dubinksy, How Communism Took Over Eastern Europe After World
War
II,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
22,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/how-communism-took-overeastern-europe-after-world-war-ii/263938/ [https://perma.cc/N93S-UR74] (explaining
23
24
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formalized as the UKUSA Agreement on March 5, 1946.33 As
dominion nations of the British Commonwealth at the time, New
Zealand, Australia, and Canada were given elevated status over
other third-party members to the alliance.34 This initial Agreement
specifically related to “foreign intelligence,” which was defined as:
[A]ll communications of the government or of any military, air,
or naval force, faction, party, department, agency, or bureau of a
foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting
to act therefor, and shall include communications of a foreign
country which may contain information of military, political or
economic value.35

Surprisingly, the Agreement was not signed by President
Truman, who was in office at the time of its conception, but was
signed solely by senior military officials from the United States.36
Discussion of the legality of this novelty is addressed in Part III of
the piece.
In its infancy, the Agreement “specifically exclude[d] the U.S.,
the British Commonwealth and nations, and the British Empire from
the scope of this sort of information.”37 “By 1955, the role of the
other Five Eyes nations was formalized when the Agreement was
updated: ‘At this time only Canada, Australia and New Zealand will
be regarded as UKUSA-collaborating Commonwealth countries,’”
pursuant to an annexure in the 1955 Agreement.38
The
Commonwealth countries were required to “collaborate directly
with tasks as determined by the [NSA], and . . . exchange raw
material, technical material, and end product of these tasks.”39 At
present, most of the relevant documents for the post-1955
Agreement are still classified,40 so it is unclear how much the terms
how after the Nazis withdrew from Eastern Europe, their domination was replaced by that
of the Soviet Union).
33 Farrell, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Farrell, supra note 31.
40 Id.
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and scope of the Agreement may have changed over the last 70
years.41 In fact, the existence and legitimacy of the original 1946
Agreement was only officially acknowledged by the U.S.
government in 2010.42
Regardless of the ambiguities surrounding the exact language of
the current Agreement, due to a combination of leaks and
investigative journalism, the Agreement became public knowledge
long before 2010.43 As one may expect, the parties to the Agreement
do not always get along – backbiting and threats to stop the flow of
intelligence between the member states are commonplace.44
The occasional setback aside,45 the intelligence gathering arms
of the parties had multiple “successes” during the Cold War.46 The
United Kingdom’s General Communications Headquarters
(“GCHQ”) and the NSA continually shared intelligence on the
Soviet Union and China, while also working together on the
“Exotics,” the term British and American intelligence used to refer
to Eastern European nations.47 During the 1950s, MI6 and the CIA
jointly planned the overthrow of the democratically elected
government of Iran, placing the Shah in power.48 The following
decade, British and American intelligence were once again involved
in the overthrow of a democratically elected government – this time
resulting in the assassination of the Former Congolese Prime

Id.
Norton-Taylor, supra note 15.
43 See id.
44 See Richard Aldrich, Allied Code-Breakers Cooperate - But Not Always, THE
GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/24/intelligence-sharing-codebreakersagreement-ukusa [https://perma.cc/X4E5-2EDJ] (recounting President Nixon’s cutting off
of intelligence to the British for being too pro-Europe, with retaliations back and forth until
Watergate forced Nixon from office).
45 See id. (discussing the cut-off of Canada from intelligence sharing for three days
in 1990, until the Canadian government agreed to send warships to participate in the first
Gulf War).
46 See id. (stating that the agreement was a unique alliance that operates to this day).
47 Id.
48 See Raf Sanchez, British Diplomats Tried to Suppress Details of MI6 Role in Iran
Coup,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
19,
2013),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10253384/Britishdiplomats-tried-to-suppress-details-of-MI6-role-in-Iran-coup.html
[https://perma.cc/XC57-UFXB].
41
42

32

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

Minister Patrice Lumumba.49 In the early 1970s, the Australian
Secret Intelligence Service (“ASIS”) and the CIA jointly worked to
overthrow Chile’s democratically elected government and installed
the brutal Pinchot regime.50 Concurrently, as the Vietnam War
waged on in Indochina, GCHQ technicians, based out of the
listening station in British Hong Kong, provided significant
assistance to American intelligence in monitoring North
Vietnamese air defenses.51
The intelligence sharing network was unable to discern either
the health of the Soviet Union or its respective military
capabilities.52 The speed at which South Vietnam fell shocked the
parties to the Agreement,53 as did the fall of the Soviet Union and
the breakup of Yugoslavia.54 More recently, the parties to the
Agreement have come under fire for not being aware of or alerting
New Zealand of the massive online presence of the Christchurch
terrorist, which included “pictures of his weapons posted online
before the shooting and an apparent manifesto describing the
contours of his white supremacist and right-wing ideology shared
on social media.”55 Intelligence experts have argued that these types
of domestic terrorism are “very difficult to detect and disrupt,” and
posited that “Five Eyes countries, including New Zealand [should]
seek ways to access encrypted personal data legally in an effort to
thwart terrorist attacks.”56
These recent terror attacks57 have only added to the call for
49 Gordon Corera, MI6 and the Death of Patrice Lumumba, BBC (Apr. 2, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22006446 [https://perma.cc/3C6X-AB43].
50 Max Suich, Spymaster Stirs Spectre of Covert Foreign Activities, THE
AUSTRALIAN
(Mar.
20,
2010),
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/spymaster-stirs-spectre-of-covertforeign-activities/news-story/81531449790cf1321578d684e368905c
[https://perma.cc/6HPW-EHM6].
51 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret
Intelligence Agency 277 (2010).
52 See Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of CIA 329–30 (2006).
53 Id. at 341.
54 See id. at 329.
55 Cristina Maza, New Zealand Mosque Attack Difficult to Prevent Despite Five Eyes
Intelligence
Sharing,
Experts
Say,
NEWSWEEK
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.newsweek.com/new-zealand-mosque-attack-five-eyes-security-1365155
[https://perma.cc/NVZ3-6B9J].
56 Id.
57 See id.
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expanding the intelligence-sharing network, which has already seen
a soft expansion in recent years with the cooperation of countries
such as Germany and Japan in the Agreement, as a way to combat
“Chinese influence[,] operations[,] and investments.”58 Although
the governments of each respective nation have no comment on the
matter, a high-ranking U.S. official stated that “[c]onsultations with
our allies, with like-minded partners, on how to resolve China’s
assertive international strategy have been frequent and are gathering
momentum.”59 Combating increased Russian influence on global
issues has also been discussed.60 Further, a number of nations have
been granted “observer” status within the Agreement, giving said
nations limited access to shared intelligence.61 The exact number of
“observer” status nations is, however, unknown and estimations are
based on covert leaks.62 Overall, it appears highly likely that the
number of nations included within the Five Eyes Agreement is only
set to increase.
III. Intelligence Gathering Mechanisms: Evolution Over Time
The Agreement was signed initially in 1946 and remains in force
today.63 What started as largely “signal intelligence” gathering
transitioned into the massive “Echelon” data collection system – the
scope of which was most recently detailed by the disclosures of
various leakers, including Edward Snowden.64 This section will
analyze the changes over time in mechanisms used by parties to the
Agreement, highlighting the increasing amount of intelligence that
is being collected, while also noting when certain individual aspects
of the program became public.
Following the outline set forth in the updated 1955 Agreement,
the three new parties to the Agreement – Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand – were to “‘collaborate directly,’ with tasks as
Barkin, supra note 13.
Id.
60 Id.
61 See Phillip Dorling, Singapore, South Korea Revealed as Five Eyes Spying
Partners,
THE
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Sep.
25,
2013),
https://www.smh.com.au/technology/singapore-south-korea-revealed-as-five-eyesspying-partners-20131124-2y433.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ7N-HW59].
62 See id.
63 Aldrich, supra note 44.
64 See Farrell, supra note 31 (defining signals as “high-frequency radio that could be
transmitted around the world”).
58
59
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determined by the NSA and ‘exchange raw material, technical
material and end product of these tasks.’”65 In the 1940’s and
1950’s, these end products were largely high-frequency radio
signals that delivered messages around the world, necessitating “a
whole network of stations to monitor HF radio” and “[m]any of
those stations are still here.”66 By the 1960’s, “these radio signals
were left behind; in their place came satellite or microwave relay
communications, and each of the parties began developing
interception methods for these. With each leap in technology came
new capabilities.”67 More specifically, as explained by Des Ball, an
Australian intelligence expert, these changes in medium meant that
data collection “moved into facilities that could intercept those
much shorter-range signals.”68
As the technological capabilities advanced, so too did the nature
of the surveillance.69 As stated above, the initial Agreement was
written with the intent “to share information about intelligence
gathered on foreign countries, not domestic surveillance.”70 The
Agreement specifically “exclude[d] the US, the British
Commonwealth and nations, and the British Empire from the scope
of this type of information.”71 This has since shifted to a policy that
“enable[d] spying on [Five Eyes] partners, even without the
permission of the other country.”72 A leaked 2005 NSA draft
directive stated that the Agreement “has evolved to include a
common understanding that both governments will not target each
other’s citizens/persons. However, when it is in the best interest of
each nation, each reserves the right to conduct unilateral Comint
[(communications intelligence)] action against each other’s
citizens/persons.”73 The same draft directive went on to further say
that “[u]nder certain circumstances, it may be advisable and
allowable to target second-party persons and second-party
communications unilaterally when it is in the best interest of the

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Farrell, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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US.”74 This change in policy is considered a major risk to the
privacy interests and constitutional rights of citizens of all nations
party to the Agreement.75 Where once there was at least something
of a “clear distinction between intelligence gathering on nonnationals and domestic citizens, [this] appears to have changed.”76
Executive Director of the Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre David
Vaile argues:
If you actually did want to spy more on the local people then it
appears that with the cooperation of the other partners this is
easier, because they would have the legal right in their own
domestic law to treat citizens of other countries as foreigners, and
that appears to be where the rot has set in.77

Although defeating terrorism and preventing death are both
noble objectives, normatively speaking, the Echelon surveillance
system “is now used to monitor billions of private communications
worldwide,” begging the question what percentage of those private
communications are even tangentially related to terrorism.78
Whistleblowers and investigative journalists have found a
substantial amount of evidence that reaffirms the argument that
parties to the Agreement use it to spy on their own citizens.79 It has
been reported that “phone, internet and email records of UK citizens
not suspected of any wrongdoing have been analyzed and stored by
the NSA under a secret deal that was approved by British
intelligence officials, according to documents from the intelligence
leaker Edward Snowden.”80 In 2007, the rules were changed to
allow the NSA to analyze and retain any British citizen’s mobile
phone and fax numbers, emails, and IP addresses swept up by its

Id.
See id.
76 Farrell, supra note 31.
77 Id.
78 See James Ball, US and UK Struck Secret Deal to Allow NSA to ‘Unmask’ Britons’
Personal
Data,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
20,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/20/us-uk-secret-deal-surveillancepersonal-data [https://perma.cc/RW8D-89GM].
79 Id.
80 Id.
74
75
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dragnet.81 “Previously, this data had been stripped out of NSA
databases – ‘minimized’ in intelligence agency parlance – under
rules agreed between the two countries.”82 These communications
were “incidentally collected”83 by the NSA, meaning the individuals
were not the initial targets of surveillance operations and, therefore,
were not suspected of wrongdoing.84
The NSA in turn used the data collected to conduct “so-called
‘pattern of life’ . . . analyses, under which the agency can look up to
three ‘hops’ away from a target of interest . . . [analysis] suggests
three hops for a typical Facebook user could pull the data of more
than 5 million people into the dragnet.”85 The same document went
on to extoll the intelligence sharing, “there are circumstances when
targeting of second party persons and communication systems, with
the full knowledge and operation of one or more parties, is allowed
when it is in the best interests of each nation.”86 The document
further laid out potential examples of such sharing, which included
“targeting a UK citizen located in London using a British telephone
system.”87 The governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom declined to comment when this batch of documents was
released, not answering whether they knew or sanctioned the change
in intelligence gathering mechanisms.88 The release of these details
may spark a general question: How is this legal?
IV. Is this Legal?
For the purposes of this section, the legality of the Five Eyes
intelligence sharing network will be analyzed solely through the
lens of the U.S. legal framework. This is not to say that there are
not legal concerns present in the other nation’s systems, but given
the United States’ leading role in the alliance, it is best to consider
the legal background of the Agreement within the United States. As

Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (defining incidental collection as collection of personal information from
individuals that “were not the initial targets of surveillance operations and therefore were
not suspected of wrongdoing.”).
84 Ball, supra note 78.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
81

2019 FIVE EYES: UNBLINKING, UNMOVING, AND OUT OF CONTROL

37

mentioned above, the Agreement was not signed by President
Truman, but by top military leaders of both the United Kingdom
and the United States.89 Passing reference is given to Presidential
authorization, specifically in an appendix signed in 1946, that
granted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) permission to
participate in the program.90 There, the Director of the FBI’s
briefing with the military leaders that signed the original agreement
is detailed, but Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, the senior-most
naval officer who served in WWII, did not directly inform President
Truman or seek authorization from him.91 Instead, Admiral Leahy
felt that:
[the] STANCIB (United States Communications Intelligence
Board) should make proper arrangements with the FBI, and work
out satisfactory arrangements with the British. Admiral Leahy
does not wish to commit the President in this whole
matter . . . because of the excellent ammunition all such dealings
would furnish the opposition were the facts to be made public at
some later point during his tenure of office.92

It is unknown whether or not President Truman was briefed on
the matter and decided to let it proceed without his authorization,
but it is unquestioned that no direct presidential authorization was
given for the creation of the Agreement in 1946.93
The updated Agreement, which brought Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand into the fold as full members on May 10, 1955, also
made no mention of direct presidential authorization.94 Instead, the
Agreement stated, “[N]o attempt should be made to over-formalize
and that the present direct exchanges of signals and letters should

89 Memorandum from W.R. Smedberg III on U.S. - British to Admiral Stone,
Admiral Inglis, General Vandenberg, General Corderman, Captain Wenger, (Feb. 19,
1946)
(on
file
with
National
Security
Agency),
https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassifieddocuments/ukusa/fbi_stancib_19feb46.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5GS-PC9H].
90 Id.
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Amendment No. 4 to the Appendices to the UKUSA Agreement (Third Edition),
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (May 10, 1955) [hereinafter Amendment No. 4].

38

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

continue.”95 It went on to state that “[i]t will be contrary to this
Agreement to reveal its existence to any third party unless otherwise
agreed by the two parties.”96
In order to be constitutional as an executive action, the
Agreement must either be an international treaty or executive
agreement, and must also pass Article VI muster.97 Analysis within
this section is broken into two parts: the first concerning whether
the Agreement is a valid international treaty or executive agreement,
and the second discussing whether Article VI of the Constitution is
violated.
A. International Treaty, Executive Agreement, or Illegal
Executive Action?
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the President of
the United States the authority to “make Treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur.”98 These treaties are treated
as the “supreme law of the land,” courtesy of the Supremacy
Clause. 99 Alternatively, the President may enter into executive
agreements, which are not considered treaties for the purpose of the
Constitution, though they are considered by some to be politically
rather than legally binding.100 Executive agreements have been
conferred the same legal status as treaties, despite not requiring the
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.101 However, the broader
permissibility of executive agreements was narrowed somewhat by
the passage of the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972,102 which states that
“[t]he Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of
any international agreement . . . other than a treaty, to which the
United States is a party as soon as practicable . . . but in no event
later than sixty days thereafter.”103

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
97 Id.
98 U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2.
99 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
100 William Green, The Encyclopedia of Civil Liberties in America, 345–48 (2004).
101 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942).
102 See 1 U.S.C § 112b(a) (2016).
103 1 U.S.C § 112b(a) (2016). But see 1. U.S.C. § 112b(e)(1) (stating the Secretary of
State shall determine for the executive branch “whether an arrangement constitutes an
international agreement within the meaning of this section.”).
95
96
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Given the Treaty Clause’s requirements noted above, it is clear
that the Agreement was never given to the U.S. Senate for the
required advice and consent. It is arguable that President Truman
did not know the full extent of the authority granted to intelligence
agencies in the Agreement,104 suggesting that this was a treaty for
the purposes of the Treaty Clause.
On the other hand, assuming that President Truman was in fact
aware of the existence of the Agreement, the Agreement could have
still legally passed muster as an executive agreement
(notwithstanding the Article VI concerns discussed below), up until
the passage of the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972. Although case law
on this issue is lacking, it stands to reason that previous Executive
Agreements would be subject to reporting requirements. Therefore,
it appears that the Agreement was not a valid executive agreement,
particularly after the passage of the Case-Zablocki Act, an act
intended to curb the very type of secret executive agreements
resembling the Agreement.105 There has been no subsequent CaseZablocki Act activity regarding the United States’ position on the
Agreement.106 Overall, even construing the constitutionality of the
Agreement as liberally as possible, it is outside reason to suggest
that the Agreement was adopted via legal executive action.
B. Does the Agreement Violate Article VI?
As noted by Senator Ted Cruz in a recent Harvard Law Review
piece, “treaties are the supreme law of the land, . . . potentially
becoming a vehicle for the federal government to either give away
power to international actors or to accumulate power otherwise
reserved to the states or individuals.”107 Although considered a
specious claim by some, others have “chomp[ed] at the bit for the
federal government to make or implement treaties as a way of
See Amendment No. 4, supra note 94.
See Stephen Bryen & Shoshana Bryen, The Case Act: A Lesson From History, PJ
MEDIA (Jan. 18, 2015), https://pjmedia.com/blog/the-case-act-a-lesson-from-history/
[https://perma.cc/JY8X-UCZB] (explaining the legislative history of the Case Act, the
passage of which arose when the Democratic Congress discovered “significant covert
agreements had been arranged between the U.S. government and South Korea, Laos,
Thailand, Ethiopia, Spain, and more”).
106 See id. (explaining that the “Case Act has been honored more in breech than in
compliance . . . Presidents have been accused of withholding relevant documents from
Congress . . . .”).
107 Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 93, 93 (2019).
104
105
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enacting laws that the Supreme Court has otherwise held as
exceeding the federal government’s powers.”108 One of the most
prominent cases in Article VI jurisprudence is that of Reid v.
Covert, 109 in which a plurality held that
[t]here is nothing in [Article VI], which intimates that treaties and
laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . . It would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution . . . to construe Article VI as permitting the United
States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions . . . . The prohibitions of the
Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the
National Government and they cannot be nullified by the
Executive[.]110

Further, in Medellin v. Texas, a majority of the court held that
the “state procedural default rules could not be displaced by a [nonself-executing treaty], an ICJ ruling, or Presidential memorand[a]111
. . . . Medellin therefore prevented the President from using a treaty
to run roughshod over the courts.”112
Assuming arguendo that the Agreement is in fact a valid treaty
or executive agreement, it is difficult to see how the Agreement can
be reconciled with the ‘constitutional prohibitions’ discussed in
Reid and Medellin. Chief amongst these prohibitions is the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states in pertinent part:
“The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated[.]”113 Case law on the Fourth Amendment suggests
that the Amendment requires “a neutral and detached authority
between the [government] and the public . . . [and is violated by
laws that permit searches to happen] indiscriminately and without
regard to their connection to a crime under investigation.”114 The

108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15–19 (1957) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008).
See Cruz, supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also 552 U.S. at 499.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54, 59 (1967).
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text of the Agreement makes no reference to an ongoing crime,
much less requisite warrant requirements. Echelon and PRISM115
metadata collection occurs far outside the scope of procedures
permitted by the Fourth Amendment.116 In its 2018 opinion of
Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court held that the government
violated the Fourth Amendment by accessing the historical records
of a cellphone’s geographic locations without a search warrant.117
Therefore, unless the Fourth Amendment has become a truism, like
the Tenth Amendment,118 the Agreement must necessarily violate
the prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” To
suggest that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the United States government, but that the
searches and seizures in question here are permissible simply
because they were conducted on behalf of the United States
government by other nations is unfathomable. To hold otherwise
would not only undermine the holding in Reid, but also allow for
the inappropriate use of the treaty power warned against by Senator
Cruz.
V. A Path Forward
It is fair to say that the existence of the Five Eyes intelligence
network is far from the center of the national consciousness, much
less the potential expansion of the intelligence network.
Nevertheless, there is a path forward for those opposed to such
potentially illegal domestic intelligence gathering. Given both the
dearth of legal challenges to the Agreement, and the lack of success
of tangentially related legal challenges,119 the best mechanism for
115 See Laura Hautala, NSA Surveillance Programs Live On, In Case You Hadn’t
Noticed, CNET (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-surveillance-programsprism-upstream-live-on-snowden/ [https://perma.cc/EC5E-8YQ8] (explaining that
PRISM is an internet data collection system that “takes the communications directly from
internet services like email providers and video chat programs.”).
116 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Given the unique
nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the
information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection.”).
117 Id.
118 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The [Tenth] [A]mendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”)
119 See generally United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (discussing the
broader standing requirement hurdles that occur in lawsuits of this kind). But see Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing to sue to prevent
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modifying, rolling back, or halting the expansion of the intelligence
gathering network is through the political branches of the United
States.
The most integral aspect of any public policy campaign is
broader public knowledge of the issue at hand.120 In this instance,
public knowledge of the Agreement is incredibly low, arguably due
to the complexity of the issue and the U.S. government’s desire for
the Agreement to remain relatively anonymous. However, the
likelihood of public awareness seems somewhat higher now than
when information about Echelon and PRISM was leaked by Edward
Snowden in 2013.121 A good start would involve the respective
Congressional Intelligence Committees, Committees on Foreign
Affairs, or any standing Committee with appropriate jurisdiction
holding public hearings on this virtually unknown Agreement. This
would necessitate the national security apparatus to explain to the
American public why the Agreement has been allowed to chip away
at the very freedoms members of the national security apparatus are
sworn to defend.
Historically speaking, the United States’ national security
apparatus has been littered with obfuscations and cover-ups, mainly
designed to maintain said apparatus’ global power and prestige.122
Attempts at quiet reform – such as President Kennedy’s private
desire to “splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it into
the winds”123 – have often resulted in harm to those attempting to

the disbursement of federal funds in contravention of the specific constitutional prohibition
against government support of religion).
120 See Stephen Lurie, Highly Educated Countries Have Better Governments, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/03/highlyeducated-countries-have-better-governments/284273/
[https://perma.cc/7XTL-XFTG]
(discussing the results of a research paper that indicated citizens complain more about
issues if they are knowledgeable and know about the issues themselves).
121 See A.W. Geiger, How Americans have viewed government surveillance and
privacy since Snowden leaks, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 4, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/04/how-americans-have-viewedgovernment-surveillance-and-privacy-since-snowden-leaks/
[https://perma.cc/WCP7373X] (showing that roughly half of Americans feel that their personal data is less secure
as of 2018 than it was five years previously which, taken with the rest of the poll’s findings,
indicates American apprehension about government surveillance).
122 See Weiner, supra note 52.
123 Jon Schwarz, In 1974 Call to Abolish CIA, Sanders Followed in Footsteps of JFK,
Truman, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/02/22/in-1974call-to-abolish-cia-sanders-followed-in-footsteps-of-jfk-truman/ [https://perma.cc/5KDY-
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implement said reform.124
The potential efficacy of a public opinion based strategy is
exemplified by observing President Trump’s many lamentations at
what he dubs the “Deep State.”125 While the term “Deep State” can
be amorphous, the broader strategy employed by the President and
his allies against the United States’ intelligence agencies provides a
useful blueprint.126 A number of recent public opinion surveys
indicate that the American public’s faith in the FBI declined from
the time Trump announced his candidacy to the present, from 64%
confidence to a bare majority of 51%.127 Among Republicans, the
drop is more substantial, falling 22 percentage points to 38%, while
Independents’ confidence fell by 15 percentage points during the
same time.128
The resounding success of message discipline – the repeated
mantra of “fake news” – has eroded confidence in the FBI in what
was once their most ardent group of defenders.129 This shift in the
views of rank-and-file voters has translated to elected officials
within the Republican Party as well.130 Just as the party of “law and
order” can turn on the law, it is reasonable to assume similar tactics
could be employed on the Democratic Party. From there, the
Agreement could be stemmed or even rolled back.

4CNF].
124 See Phillip Shenon, Yes, the CIA Director was Part of the JFK Assassination
Cover-Up,
POLITICO
(Oct.
6,
2015),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/jfk-assassination-john-mcconewarren-commission-cia-213197 [https://perma.cc/X6DJ-5LQF].
125 See Alana Abramson, President Trump’s Allies Keep Talking About the ‘Deep
State.’ What’s That?, TIME (Mar. 8, 2017), https://time.com/4692178/donald-trump-deepstate-breitbart-barack-obama/ [https://perma.cc/E2UX-A3QB].
126 See John Sipher & Benjamin Haas, Trump’s Moves Against the Intelligence
Community Are Hurting U.S. National Security, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62439/trumps-moves-intelligence-community-crippling-us-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/C2LT-F9DZ].
127 See Emily Stewart, Republican Confidence in the FBI has Declined in the Age of
Trump, VOX (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/latest-news/2018/2/3/16968372/trumpfbi-republican-poll-confidence [https://perma.cc/NK4N-V56Y].
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See Zachary Basu, Republican Blocks Bill Requiring Campaigns to Alert FBI to
Foreign Assistance, AXIOS (June 13, 2019), https://www.axios.com/marsha-blackburnforeign-offers-assistance-campaigns-fab324f4-a630-41aa-9b90-a6fc4ca5c5d0.html
[https://perma.cc/8B36-UXDF].
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Ironically, one of the few international agreements that
President Trump has not withdrawn the United States from is the
Agreement.131 Yet, there are signs that the Agreement is within the
sights of the President.132 The British government is currently in
talks with Chinese media conglomerate Huawei to build a portion
of the United Kingdom’s new 5G high-speed mobile network.133
“Huawei has faced tremendous pressure from the Trump
administration as the U.S. claims the company’s equipment could
be used for espionage by the Chinese government.”134 Huawei
already faces “criminal charges from the Justice Department after
being accused of stealing trade secrets and skirting U.S. sanctions
on Iran,” and U.S. government agencies are banned from buying
Huawei-manufactured equipment – which is being challenged in
federal court by Huawei.135 Huawei argues that “banning Huawei
products from the United States would not make the nation’s
networks more secure and in fact could distract from larger and
more pressing security threats.”136 There is a motion pending for
summary judgment on behalf of Huawei.137
The United States has successfully convinced Australia, a party
to the Agreement, to block the company’s equipment from being
used.138 The United Kingdom is said to have “let Huawei provide
‘non-core’ technology, like antennas, to the country’s mobile

131 See Martin Finucane & Jeremiah Manion, Trump Has Pulled out of International
Agreements Before. Here’s a List, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/02/01/trump-has-pulled-out-internationalagreements-before-here-list/H9zTo2ctVEQ0b8xkUQ2t9J/story.html
[https://perma.cc/SU9X-TDCY] (describing several international agreements from which
President Trump has withdrawn or threatened to withdraw the United States, including the
Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
132 See Saheli Roy Choudhury, Trump Reportedly Will Threaten to Curb Intelligence
Sharing
with
the
UK
Over
Huawei
(May
30,
2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/31/trump-to-threaten-to-curb-intelligence-sharing-withuk-over-huawei-ft.html [https://perma.cc/RTF5-KPF4].
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Paul Mozur, Huawei Revs Up Its U.S. Lawsuit, With the Media in Mind, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/business/huawei-uslawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/VB3N-NQRT].
137 Id.
138 See Choudhury, supra note 132.

2019 FIVE EYES: UNBLINKING, UNMOVING, AND OUT OF CONTROL

45

operators for the next generation networks.”139 The U.K., however,
will not allow the Chinese firm to provide so-called ‘core’
technology that includes software and other equipment linking
primary internet connections,” which is still short of the demands
from the Trump administration.140 As noted above, the volume of
ongoing data-sharing between parties to the Agreement141 means
that if the Chinese government were to gain access to British
intelligence, they would have access to the entire Agreement
network. Yet, the existence of such an Agreement means that at all
times the entire network is one unsecured vendor away from a
massive security breach that would undermine the very security the
Agreement purports to defend.
VI. Conclusion
“Five Eyes,” as described above, is already something of a
misnomer. There are formal and informal side-agreements – as
third parties have described in the Agreement’s original text142 -with a host of other states,143 ranging from South Korea to
Germany.144 As the world seemingly steps back from the themes of
liberal democracy that characterized the post-war world,145 the
existence of the Agreement is justified differently – ranging from
protecting the remaining liberal democracies to the protection of
“economic well-being” – but justified nonetheless. 146 As the
Agreement’s scope and size expands, the chances of culling this
likely unconstitutional arrangement lessen by the day. Technology
is constantly updating and moving forward, and as it does, so does
139
Elizabeth Schulze, UK Will Reportedly Allow Huawei to Build Out Part of its 5G
Network, CNBC, (April 24, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/24/uk-to-allowhuawei-to-build-out-parts-of-its-5g-networks-reports.html
[https://perma.cc/PW7MX9MX].
140 Id.
141 See Ball, supra note 78.
142 See Kim, supra note 8.
143 See Farrell, supra note 31.
144 See Dorling, supra note 61.
145 See Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019, FREEDOM HOUSE, (2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWebcompressed.pdf (demonstrating that the Freedom World study has shown a decrease in
global freedom for the past thirteen years running).
146 See Stilgherrian, Australia Signals Indo-Pacific Focus for Five Eyes, ZDNET (June
13, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/australia-signals-indo-pacific-focus-for-fiveeyes/ [https://perma.cc/KP3X-L2L7].
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the power of the Agreement’s parties to spy on their own citizens.
Regardless of one’s agreement or disagreement with the proffered
solution, the facts remain the same. As the national security
apparatus continues to blunder its way forward, inadvertently
allowing or creating national security emergencies, an argument for
more intelligence-gathering tools will always exist. From the
flaming oil-filled waters of Pearl Harbor to smoke-filled skies of
Manhattan, there is no denying the dangers that the broader world
presents. However, as once famously stated by Benjamin Franklin,
“[t]hose who would give up essential [l]iberty, to purchase a little
temporary safety, deserve neither[.]”147 One would be wise to
remember those words, regardless of the year.

147 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor 11 November
1755,
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES,
(Jan.
2019),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-06-02-0107
[https://perma.cc/9V8U-MP8J].

